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This paper builds a framework for the analysis of macroeconomic fluctuations that incorporates the
endogenous determination of the number of producers over the business cycle. Economic expansions
induce higher entry rates by prospective entrants subject to irreversible investment costs. The sluggish
response of the number of producers (due to the sunk entry costs) generates a new and potentially
important endogenous propagation mechanism for real business cycle models. The stock-market price
of investment (corresponding to the creation of new productive units) determines household saving
decisions, producer entry, and the allocation of labor across sectors. The model performs at least as
well as the benchmark real business cycle model with respect to the implied second-moment properties
of key macroeconomic aggregates. In addition, our framework jointly predicts a procyclical number
of producers and procyclical profits even for preference specifications that imply countercyclical markups.
When we include physical capital, the model can reproduce the variance and autocorrelation of GDP
found in the data.
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mmelitz@princeton.edu1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The number of producers in the economy varies over the business cycle. Figure 1 shows the
quarterly growth rates of real GDP, proﬁts, and net entry in the U.S. economy (measured as
the diﬀerence between new incorporations and failures) for the period 1947-1998.1 Net entry is
strongly procyclical and comoves with real proﬁts, which are also procyclical. Figure 2 shows cross
correlations between real GDP, proﬁts, and net entry (Hodrick-Prescott ﬁltered data in logs) at
various leads and lags, with 95 percent conﬁdence bands. The strong procyclicality of net entry
and proﬁts is evident, with net entry strongly correlated to proﬁts. Importantly, Figure 2 shows
that net entry tends to lead GDP and proﬁt expansions, suggesting that entry in the expectation
of future proﬁt sm a yp l a ya ni m p o r t a n tr o l ei nG D Pe x p a n s i o n s . 2
This paper studies the role of producer entry and product creation in propagating business
cycle ﬂuctuations in a dynamic, stochastic, general equilibrium (DSGE) model with monopolistic
competition and sunk entry costs. We seek to understand the contributions of the intensive and
extensive margins — changes in production of existing goods and in the range of available goods —
to the response of the economy to changes in aggregate productivity and market regulation (which
aﬀects the size of sunk entry costs). Our theoretical model will equate a producer with a production
line for an individual variety/good. We naturally want to account for the empirical reality that
new products are not only introduced by new ﬁrms, but also by existing ﬁrms (most often at
their existing production facilities).3 We therefore take a broad view of producer entry and exit
as also incorporating product creation and destruction by existing ﬁrms (although our model does
not address the determinants of product variety within ﬁrms). Although new ﬁrms account for
a small share of overall production (for U.S. manufacturing, new ﬁrms account for 2-3% of both
overall production and employment), the contribution of new products (including those produced
at existing ﬁrms) is substantially larger — important enough to be a major source of aggregate
output ﬂuctuations. Furthermore, as is the case with ﬁrm entry, new product creation is also very
strongly procyclical.
1Authors’ computations from the following sources: GDP, GDP implicit price deﬂator, proﬁts before tax, and new
business incorporations from Basic Economics Database, Global Insight, Inc.; Business failures from NBER Macro-
history Database (1947-1965), The Economic Report of the President (1965-1982), and Basic Economics Database,
Global Insight, Inc. (1982-1998).
2The procyclical pattern of net entry is the result of a strongly procyclical pattern of new incorporations and a
countercyclical pattern of failures, which correlate negatively with GDP and proﬁts.
3Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2006) report that 94% of product additions by U.S. manufacturing ﬁrms occur
within their pre-existing production facilities (as opposed to new plants or via mergers and acquisitions). Broda and
Weinstein (2007) conﬁrm this ﬁnding using the ﬁnest possible level of product disaggregation at the UPC (barcode)
level. They ﬁnd that 92% of such product creation occurs within existing ﬁrms.
1This important contribution of product creation and destruction to aggregate output dynamics
is convincingly documented in two new papers by Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2006) and Broda
and Weinstein (2007), which are the ﬁrst to measure product creation and destruction within ﬁrms
across a large portion of the U.S. economy. Bernard, Redding, and Schott’s (2006) data covers all
U.S. manufacturing ﬁrms. For each, they record production levels (dollar values) across 5-digit U.S.
SIC categories, which still represent a very coarse deﬁnition of products.4 Bernard, Redding, and
Schott (2006) document that product creation and destruction within ﬁr m si sp r e v a l e n t :6 8 %o f
ﬁrms change their product mix within a 5-year census period (representing 93% of ﬁrms weighted
by output). Of these ﬁrms, 66% both add and drop products (representing 87% of ﬁrms weighted
by output). Thus, product creation over time is not just a secular trend at the ﬁrm-level (whereby
ﬁrms steadily increase the range of products they produce over time). Most importantly, Bernard,
Redding, and Schott (2006) show that product creation and destruction accounts for an important
share of overall production: Over a 5-year period — a horizon usually associated with the length
of business cycles —, the value of new products (produced at existing ﬁrms) is 33.6% of overall
output during that period (-30.4% of output for the lost value from product destruction at existing
ﬁrms). These numbers are almost twice (1.8 times) as large as those accounted for by changes at
the intensive margin — production increases and decreases for the same product at existing ﬁrms.
The overall contribution of the extensive margin (product creation and destruction) would be even
higher if a ﬁner level of product disaggregation (beyond the 5-digit level) were available.5
Put together, product creation (both by existing ﬁrms and new ﬁrms) accounts for 46.6% of
output in a 5-year period while the lost value from product destruction (by existing and exiting
ﬁrms) accounts for 44% of output. This represents a minimal annual contribution of 9.3% (for
product creation) and 8.8% (for product destruction).6 This substantial contribution of product
creation and destruction is also conﬁrmed by Broda and Weinstein (2007), who measure products
at the ﬁnest possible level of disaggregation: the product barcode. Their data cover all of the
purchases of products with barcodes by a representative sample of U.S. consumers. They ﬁnd that
4As an example, the 5-digit SIC codes within the 4-digit SIC category 3949—Sporting and Athletics Goods— are:
39491—Fishing tackle and equipment, 39492—Golf equipment, 39493—Playground equipment, 39494—Gymnasium and
exercise equipment, and 39495—Other sporting and athletic goods. For all of U.S. manufacturing, there are 1848
5-digit products.
5Returning to the example of 5-digit SIC 39494 (Gymnasium and exercise equipment) from the previous footnote:
Any production of a new equipment product, whether a treadmill, an elliptical machine, a stationary bike, or any
weight machine, would be recorded as production of the same product and hence be counted towards the intensive
margin of production.
6The true annual contributions are higher as additions and reductions to output across years within the same
5-year interval (for a given ﬁrm-product combination) are not recorded.
29% of those consumers’ purchases in a year are devoted to new goods not previously available.7
Crucially, Broda and Weinstein (2007) report that this product creation is strongly procyclical at
quarterly business cycle frequencies. They ﬁnd that, across product groups, almost a third of the
growth rate of consumption expenditures is also reﬂected in the growth rate of expenditure shares
in new product varieties. This evidence on the strong procyclicality of product creation is also
conﬁrmed by Axarloglou (2003) for U.S. manufacturing at a monthly frequency.
I no u rm o d e l ,w ea s s u m es y m m e t r i c ,h o m o t h e t i c preferences over a continuum of goods that
nest analytically tractable speciﬁcations as special cases. When preferences are speciﬁed in the
familiar C.E.S. form of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), frictionless price adjustment results in constant
markups. If preferences take the translog form proposed by Feenstra (2003), demand-side pricing
complementarities arise that result in time-varying markups. To keep the setup simple, we do not
model multi-product ﬁrms. In our model presentation below, and in the discussion of results, there
is a one-to-one identiﬁcation between a producer, product, and ﬁr m .T h i si sc o n s i s t e n tw i t hm u c ho f
the macroeconomic literature with monopolistic competition, which similarly uses ‘ﬁrm’ to refer to
the producer of an individual good. However, each productive unit in our setup is best interpreted
as a production line within a multi-product ﬁrm whose boundaries we can leave unspeciﬁed without
concern for strategic ﬁrm interactions thanks to the assumption of a continuum of goods as long as
each multi-product ﬁrm produces a countable set of goods of measure zero. The producer is then
the proﬁt maximizing manager of this production line. In this interpretation, producer entry and
exit in our model capture the product-switching dynamics within ﬁr m sd o c u m e n t e db yB e r n a r d ,
Redding, and Schott (2006).8
In our baseline setup, each individual producer/ﬁrm produces output using only labor. However,
the number of ﬁrms that produce in each period can be interpreted as the capital stock of the
economy, and the decision of households to ﬁnance entry of new ﬁrms is akin to the decision to
accumulate physical capital in the standard real business cycle (RBC) model.9 Methodologically,
just as the RBC model is a discrete-time, stochastic, general equilibrium version of the exogenous
7This 9% ﬁgure is low relative to its 9.3% counterpart from Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2006), given the
substantial diﬀerence in product disaggregation across the two studies (the extent of product creation increases
monotonically with the level of product disaggregation). We surmise that this is due to the product sampling of
Broda and Weinstein’s (2007) data: only including ﬁnal goods with barcodes. Food items, which have the lowest
l e v e l so fp r o d u c tc r e a t i o nr a t e s ,t e n dt ob eo v e r - r e p r e s e n t e di nt h o s es a m p l e s .
8The ability to leave the boundaries of ﬁrms unspeciﬁed without concern for strategic interactions within and
across ﬁrms aﬀo r d e db yc o n t i n u i t yd i ﬀerentiates our approach from Jaimovich’s (2004), who assumes a discrete set
of producers within each sector. In that case, the boundaries of ﬁrms crucially determine the strategic interaction
between individual competitors.
9In fact, we show that our model relates quite transparently to the traditional RBC model pioneered by Kydland
and Prescott (1982).
3growth model that abstracts from growth to focus on business cycles, our model can be viewed as a
discrete-time, stochastic, general equilibrium version of variety-based, endogenous growth models
(see e.g. Romer, 1990, and Grossman and Helpman, 1991) that abstracts from endogenous growth.
This diﬀerence in methodology generates signiﬁcant diﬀerences in results relative to RBC theory.
First and foremost, the investment in new productive units that we emphasize is ﬁnanced by
households through the accumulation of shares in the portfolio of ﬁrms that operate in the economy.
The stock-market price of this investment ﬂuctuates endogenously in response to shocks and is
at the core of our propagation mechanism. It determines household saving decisions, producer
entry, and the allocation of labor across sectors of the economy. This is in contrast with the
price of physical capital in standard RBC models, which is constant absent capital adjustment
costs. Our approach to investment, capital, and their price provides an alternative to assuming
adjustment costs in order to obtain a time-varying price of capital and introduces a direct link
between investment and (the expectation of) economic proﬁts. Moreover, we show that entry plays
an important role in the propagation of responses to shocks. If aggregate productivity increases
permanently, the expansion of aggregate GDP initially takes place at the intensive margin, with
an increase in output of existing ﬁrms. Higher productivity makes entry more attractive and labor
is reallocated to creation of new ﬁrms. Over time, the number of ﬁrms in the economy increases,
and output per ﬁrm decreases. Further aggregate GDP expansion is the result of an increasing
number of producers. In the long run, when preferences are of C.E.S. form, output per ﬁrm returns
to the initial steady-state level and permanent GDP expansion is entirely driven by the extensive
margin. These labor reallocation dynamics and intensive-extensive margin eﬀects are absent in
the standard RBC framework. Importantly, even if total labor supply is ﬁxed, and hence net
job creation is absent, our model predicts sizeable gross job ﬂows, precisely due to intersectoral
reallocations.10 With translog preferences (for which the elasticity of substitution is increasing in
the number of goods produced), our model is further able to simultaneously generate countercyclical
markups and procyclical proﬁts, and to reproduce the time proﬁle of the markup’s correlation with
the business cycle. These are well-known challenges for models of countercyclical markups based
on sticky prices (see Rotemberg and Woodford, 1999, for a discussion).
Our model’s performance in matching key second moments of the U.S. business cycle is virtually
indistinguishable from that of a traditional RBC model. Importantly, however, our model can
10This is consistent with evidence of small net job ﬂows, but large gross ﬂows in Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh
(1996).
4additionally account for stylized facts pertaining to entry, proﬁts, and markups. To the best of our
knowledge, our framework is the ﬁrst to address and explain these issues simultaneously.11 Since
our model performs comparably to the RBC benchmark relative to key aggregate business cycle
statistics, and it explains and reproduces features of evidence on which RBC theory is silent, we
view the balance of results as favorable to the mechanisms we highlight. Moreover, inclusion of
physical capital both in production of existing goods and creation of new ones — combining our
propagation mechanism with the traditional capital accumulation of RBC theory — signiﬁcantly
improves the performance of the model along several important dimensions. Most notably, our
model can then closely match the volatility and persistence of GDP, another well-known challenge
for business cycle models.12
Chatterjee and Cooper (1993) and Devereux, Head, and Lapham (1996a,b) already documented
the procyclical nature of entry and developed general equilibrium models with monopolistic com-
petition to study the eﬀect of entry and exit on the dynamics of the business cycle. However, entry
is frictionless in their models: There is no sunk entry cost, and ﬁrms enter instantaneously in each
period until all proﬁt opportunities are exploited. A ﬁxed period-by-period cost then serves to
bound the number of operating ﬁrms. A free-entry condition implies zero proﬁts in all periods,
and the number of producing ﬁrms in each period is not a state variable. Thus, these models were
not able to jointly address the procyclicality of proﬁts and entry documented in Figures 1 and 2.
In contrast, entry in our model is subject to a sunk entry cost and a time-to-build lag, and the free
entry condition equates the expected present discounted value of proﬁts to the sunk cost.13 Thus,
proﬁts are allowed to vary and the number of ﬁrms is a state variable in our model, consistent
w i t ht h ee v i d e n c ep r e s e n t e da b o v ea n dt h ew i d espread view that the number of producing ﬁrms
is ﬁxed in the short run.14 Finally, our model exhibits a steady state in which: (i) the share of
11Perfect-competition models, such as the standard RBC, address none of these facts. Imperfect-competition
versions (with or without sticky prices) generate ﬂuctuations in proﬁts (and, for sticky prices, in markups) but no
entry. Free-entry models reviewed below generate ﬂuctuations in entry (and, in some versions — such as Cook (2001),
Jaimovich (2004), or Comin and Gertler (2006)—, also markups) but with zero proﬁts.
12The extended model also predicts more volatile consumption and hours worked than both our benchmark and
the RBC case. However, it also counterfactually predicts less volatile investment.
13Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2006) and Broda and Weinstein (2007) also document a pattern of product
creation and destruction that is most consistent with sunk product development costs subject to uncertainty — as
featured in our model.
14In fact, our model features a ﬁxed number of producing ﬁr m sw i t h i ne a c hp e r i o da n daf u l l yﬂexible number
of ﬁrms in the long run. Ambler and Cardia (1998) and Cook (2001) take a ﬁrst step in our direction. A period-
by-period zero proﬁt condition holds only in expectation in their models, allowing for ex post proﬁt variation in
response to unexpected shocks, and the number of ﬁrms in each period is predetermined relative to shocks in that
period. Benassy (1996) analyzes the persistence properties of a variant of the model developed by Devereux, Head,
and Lapham (1996a,b). The dynamics of producer entry and exit have also received recent attention in open economy
studies. See, for instance, Corsetti, Martin, and Pesenti (2007) and Ghironi and Melitz (2005).
5proﬁts in capital is constant and (ii) the share of investment is positively correlated with the share
of proﬁts. These are among the ‘Kaldorian’ growth facts outlined in Cooley and Prescott (1995),
which neither the standard RBC model nor the frictionless entry model can account for (the former
because it is based on perfect competition, the latter because the share of proﬁts is zero).
Entry subject to sunk costs, with the implications that we stressed above, also distinguishes
our model from more recent contributions such as Comin and Gertler (2006) and Jaimovich (2004),
who also assume a period-by-period, zero-proﬁt condition.15 O u rm o d e lf u r t h e rd i ﬀers from Comin
and Gertler’s along three dimensions: (i) we focus on a standard deﬁnition of the business cycle,
whereas they focus on the innovative notion of ‘medium term’ cycles; (ii) our model generates
countercyclical markups due to demand-side pricing complementarities, whereas Comin and Gertler,
like Galí (1995), postulate a function for markups which is decreasing in the number of ﬁrms; and
ﬁnally (iii) our model features exogenous, RBC-type technology shocks, whereas Comin and Gertler
consider endogenous technology and use wage markup shocks as the source of business cycles.16
The source of cyclical movements in markups further diﬀerentiates our work from Jaimovich’s (and
Cook, 2001), where countercyclical markups occur due to supply-side considerations — i.e., increased
competition leading to lower markups. We prefer a demand-, preference-based explanation for
countercyclical markups since data suggest that most of the entering and exiting ﬁrms are small,
and much of the change in the product space is due to product switching within existing ﬁrms
rather than entry of entirely new ﬁrms, pointing to a limited role for supply-driven competitive
pressures in explaining markup dynamics over the business cycle.17
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the benchmark model. Section 3
discusses some key properties of the model and solves for its steady state. Section 4 illustrates the
dynamic properties of the model for transmission of economic ﬂuctuations by means of a numerical
example, computing impulse responses and second moments of the artiﬁcial economy. Section 5
15Sunk entry costs are a feature of Hopenhayn and Rogerson’s (1993) model, which is designed to analyze the
employment consequences of ﬁrm entry and exit, and thus directly addresses the evidence in Davis, Haltiwanger, and
Schuh (1996). However, Hopenhayn and Rogerson assume perfect competition in goods markets (as in Hopenhayn’s,
1992, seminal model) and abstract from aggregate dynamics by focusing on stationary equilibria in which prices,
employment, output, and the number of ﬁrms are all constant. Lewis (2006) builds on the framework of this paper
and estimates VAR responses (including those of proﬁts and entry) to macroeconomic shocks, ﬁnding support for the
sunk-cost driven dynamics predicted by our model.
16Consistent with standard RBC theory, aggregate productivity shocks aﬀect all ﬁrms uniformly in our model. We
abstract from the more complex technology diﬀusion processes across ﬁrms of diﬀerent vintages studied by Caballero
and Hammour (1994) and Campbell (1998). We also do not address the growth eﬀects of changes in product variety.
Bils and Klenow (2001) document that these eﬀects are empirically relevant for the U.S.
17Bergin and Corsetti (2005) have used the same type of translog preferences in a similar model, looking at issues
of stabilization policy. Dos Santos Ferreira and Dufourt (2006) motivate markup ﬂuctuations in their model with the
inﬂuence of “animal spirits” that aﬀect ﬁrm entry and exit decisions.
6extends the model to include physical capital. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Benchmark Model
Household Preferences and the Intratemporal Consumption Choice
The economy is populated by a unit mass of atomistic, identical households. All contracts and
prices are written in nominal terms. Prices are ﬂexible. Thus, we only solve for the real variables
in the model. However, as the composition of the consumption basket changes over time due to
ﬁrm entry (aﬀecting the deﬁnition of the consumption-based price index), we introduce money as
a convenient unit of account for contracts. Money plays no other role in the economy. For this
reason, we do not model the demand for cash currency, and resort to a cashless economy as in
Woodford (2003).
The representative household supplies Lt hours of work each period t in a competitive labor mar-
ket for the nominal wage rate Wt and maximizes expected intertemporal utility Et
£P∞
s=t βs−tU (Cs,L s)
¤
,
where C is consumption and β ∈ (0,1) the subjective discount factor. The period utility function
takes the form U (Ct,L t)=l nCt−χ(Lt)
1+1/ϕ /(1 + 1/ϕ), χ>0,w h e r eϕ ≥ 0 is the Frisch elastic-
ity of labor supply to wages, and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in labor supply. As in
Campbell (1994), our choice of functional form for the utility function is guided by results in King,
Plosser, and Rebelo (1988): Given separable preferences, log utility from consumption ensures that
income and substitution eﬀects of real wage variation on eﬀort cancel out in steady state; this is
necessary to have constant steady-state eﬀort and balanced growth if there is productivity growth.
At time t, the household consumes the basket of goods Ct,d e ﬁned over a continuum of goods
Ω. At any given time t, only a subset of goods Ωt ⊂ Ω is available. Let pt (ω) denote the nominal
price of a good ω ∈ Ωt. Our model can be solved for any parametrization of symmetric homothetic
preferences. For any such preferences, there exists a well deﬁned consumption index Ct and an
associated welfare-based price index Pt. The demand for an individual variety, ct (ω),i st h e n
obtained as ct(ω)dω = Ct∂Pt/∂pt(ω), where we use the conventional notation for quantities with a
continuum of goods as ﬂow values.18
Given the demand for an individual variety, the symmetric price elasticity of demand ζ is in
general a function of the number Nt of goods/producers (where Nt is the mass of Ωt): ζ(Nt) ≡
(∂ct(ω)/∂pt(ω))(pt(ω)/ct(ω)), for any symmetric variety ω. The beneﬁt of additional product
18See the appendix for more details.
7variety is described by the relative price ρt (ω)=ρ(Nt) ≡ pt(ω)/Pt, for any symmetric variety ω,
or, in elasticity form:  (Nt) ≡ ρ0(Nt)Nt/ρ(Nt). Together, ζ(Nt) and ρ(Nt) completely characterize
the eﬀects of consumption preferences in our model; explicit expressions for these objects can be
obtained upon specifying functional forms for preferences, as will become clear in the discussion
below.
Firms
There is a continuum of monopolistically competitive ﬁrms, each producing a diﬀerent variety
ω ∈ Ω. Production requires only one factor, labor. Aggregate labor productivity is indexed by
Zt, which represents the eﬀectiveness of one unit of labor. Zt is exogenous and follows an AR(1)
process (in logarithms). Output supplied by ﬁrm ω is yt (ω)=Ztlt (ω),w h e r elt (ω) is the ﬁrm’s
labor demand for productive purposes. The unit cost of production, in units of the consumption
good Ct,i swt/Zt,w h e r ewt ≡ Wt/Pt is the real wage.
Prior to entry, ﬁrms face a sunk entry cost of fE,t eﬀective labor units, equal to wtfE,t/Zt units
of the consumption good.19 The sunk entry cost fE,t is exogenous and subject to shocks. (We
interpret a permanent decrease as deregulation that lowers the size of entry barriers below.) There
are no ﬁxed production costs. Hence, all ﬁrms that enter the economy produce in every period,
until they are hit with a “death” shock, which occurs with probability δ ∈ (0,1) in every period.20
Given our modeling assumption relating each ﬁrm to an individual variety, we think of a ﬁrm as
a production line for that variety, and the entry cost as the development and setup cost associated
with the latter (potentially inﬂuenced by market regulation). The exogenous “death” shock also
takes place at the individual variety level. Empirically, a ﬁrm may comprise more than one of these
production lines. Our model does not address the determination of product variety within ﬁrms,
but our main results would be unaﬀected by the introduction of multi-product ﬁrms.
Given the demand function for each good (where the elasticity of demand can depend on the
number of goods), ﬁrms set prices in a ﬂexible fashion as markups over marginal costs. In units of
consumption, ﬁrm ω’s price is ρt (ω) ≡ pt (ω)/Pt = μtwt/Zt, where the markup is a function of the
number of producers: μt = μ(Nt) ≡ ζ(Nt)/(ζ(Nt)+1 ). The ﬁrm’s proﬁt in units of consumption,






19In assuming that the entry cost is deﬁned in labor units we follow, among others, Grossman and Helpman (1991),
Judd (1985), and Romer (1990).
20For simplicity, we do not consider endogenous exit. Appropriate calibration of δ makes it possible for our model
to match several important features of the data.
8Preference Speciﬁcations and Markups
In our quantitative exercises, we consider two alternative preference speciﬁcations. The ﬁrst fea-
tures constant elasticity of substitution between goods as in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). For these












, and the household’s demand for each individual good ω is
ct (ω)=( pt (ω)/Pt)
−θ Ct.I tf o l l o w st h a tt h em a r k u pa n dt h eb e n e ﬁt of variety are independent of
the number of goods ( (Nt)= ,μ(Nt)=μ) and related by   = μ − 1=1 /(θ − 1).21 The second
speciﬁcation uses the translog expenditure function proposed by Feenstra (2003), which introduces
demand-side pricing complementarities. For this preference speciﬁcation, the symmetric price elas-
ticity of demand is −(1 + σNt), σ>0:A sNt increases, goods become closer substitutes, and the
elasticity of substitution 1+σNt increases. If goods are closer substitutes, then the markup μ(Nt)
and the beneﬁt of additional varieties in elasticity form ( (Nt)) must decrease.22 The change in
 (Nt) is only half the change in net markup generated by an increase in the number of producers.
Table 1 contains the expressions for markup, relative price, and the beneﬁt of variety (the elasticity
of ρ to the number of ﬁrms), for each preference speciﬁcation.23
Table 1. Two frameworks
C.E.S. Translog
μ(Nt)=μ = θ















σ ˜ NNt , ˜ N ≡ Mass(Ω)
 (Nt)=μ − 1  (Nt)= 1
2σNt = 1
2 (μ(Nt) − 1)
21An alternative setup would have the household consume a homogeneous good produced by a competitive sector
that bundles intermediate goods using a production function that has the form of our consumption basket. All
our results would hold also in that setup, though the interpretation would be diﬀerent. In our setup, consumers
derive welfare directly from availability of more varieties. In the alternative setup, an increased range of intermediate
goods shows up as increasing returns to specialization. Empirical problems associated with increasing returns to
specialization and a C.E.S. production function induce us to adopt the speciﬁcation without intermediate varieties.
22This property for the markup occurs whenever the price elasticity of residual demand decreases with quantity
consumed along the residual demand curve.
23Note that while none of the two preference speciﬁc a t i o n si sn e s t e di nt h eo t h e r ,t h e ya r eb o t hn e s t e di nt h eg e n e r a l
class of (homothetic) preferences we consider. Moreover, insofar as the log-linear version of the model is concerned,
it is possible to verify that the translog case nests the C.E.S. one.
9Firm Entry and Exit
In every period, there is a mass Nt of ﬁrms producing in the economy and an unbounded mass of
prospective entrants. These entrants are forward looking, and correctly anticipate their expected
future proﬁts ds (ω) in every period s ≥ t +1as well as the probability δ (in every period) of
incurring the exit-inducing shock. Entrants at time t only start producing at time t +1 ,w h i c h
introduces a one-period time-to-build lag in the model. The exogenous exit shock occurs at the
very end of the time period (after production and entry). A proportion δ of new entrants will
therefore never produce. Prospective entrants in period t compute their expected post-entry value












This also represents the value of incumbent ﬁrms after production has occurred (since both new
entrants and incumbents then face the same probability 1 − δ of survival and production in the
subsequent period). Entry occurs until ﬁrm value is equalized with the entry cost, leading to the
free entry condition vt (ω)=wtfE,t/Zt. This condition holds so long as the mass NE,t of entrants
is positive. We assume that macroeconomic shocks are small enough for this condition to hold
in every period. Finally, the timing of entry and production we have assumed implies that the
number of producing ﬁrms during period t is given by Nt =( 1− δ)(Nt−1 + NE,t−1).T h en u m b e r
of producing ﬁrms represents the stock of capital of the economy. It is an endogenous state variable
that behaves much like physical capital in the benchmark RBC model, but in contrast to the latter
has an endogenously ﬂuctuating price given by (1).
Symmetric Firm Equilibrium
All ﬁrms face the same marginal cost. Hence, equilibrium prices, quantities, and ﬁrm values are
identical across ﬁrms: pt (ω)=pt, ρt (ω)=ρt, lt (ω)=lt, yt (ω)=yt, dt (ω)=dt, vt (ω)=vt.
In turn, equality of prices across ﬁrms implies that the consumption-based price index Pt and the
ﬁrm-level price pt are such that pt/Pt ≡ ρt = ρ(Nt). A ni n c r e a s ei nt h en u m b e ro fﬁrms implies
necessarily that the relative price of each individual good increases, ρ0 (Nt) > 0. When there are
more ﬁrms, households derive more welfare from spending a given nominal amount, i.e., ceteris
paribus, the price index decreases. It follows that the relative price of each individual good must
10rise.24 The aggregate consumption output of the economy is Ntρtyt = Ct.
Importantly, in the symmetric ﬁrm equilibrium, the value of waiting to enter is zero, despite the
entry decision being subject to sunk cost and exit risk; i.e., there are no option-value considerations
pertaining to the entry decision. This happens because all uncertainty in our model (including the
“death” shock) is aggregate.25
Household Budget Constraint and Optimal Behavior
Households hold two types of assets: shares in a mutual fund of ﬁrms and risk-free bonds. (We
assume that bonds pay risk-free, consumption-based real returns.) Let xt be the share in the mutual
fund of ﬁrms held by the representative household entering period t. The mutual fund pays a total
proﬁt in each period (in units of currency) equal to the total proﬁto fa l lﬁrms that produce in
that period, PtNtdt.D u r i n g p e r i o dt, the representative household buys xt+1 shares in a mutual
fund of NH,t ≡ Nt + NE,t ﬁrms (those already operating at time t and the new entrants). Only
Nt+1 =( 1− δ)NH,t ﬁrms will produce and pay dividends at time t +1 . Since the household does
not know which ﬁr m sw i l lb eh i tb yt h ee x o g e n o u se x i ts h o c kδ at the very end of period t,i t
ﬁnances the continuing operation of all pre-existing ﬁrms and all new entrants during period t.T h e
date t price (in units of currency) of a claim to the future proﬁt stream of the mutual fund of NH,t
ﬁrms is equal to the nominal price of claims to future ﬁrm proﬁts, Ptvt.26
The household enters period t with bond holdings Bt in units of consumption and mutual
fund share holdings xt. It receives gross interest income on bond holdings, dividend income on
mutual fund share holdings and the value of selling its initial share position, and labor income.
The household allocates these resources between purchases of bonds and shares to be carried into
next period, and consumption. The period budget constraint (in units of consumption) is:
Bt+1 + vtNH,txt+1 + Ct =( 1+rt)Bt +( dt + vt)Ntxt + wtLt, (2)
24In the alternative setup with homogeneous consumption produced by aggregating intermediate goods, an increase
in the number of intermediates available implies that the competitive sector producing consumption becomes more
eﬃcient, and the relative price of each individual input relative to consumption rises accordingly.
25See the appendix for the proof. This is in contrast with models such as Caballero and Hammour (1995) and
Campbell (1998). See also Jovanovic (2006) for a more recent contribution in that vein.
26New entrants ﬁnance entry on the stock market in our model. This is consistent with observed behavior of
existing ﬁrms, raising capital on the stock market to ﬁn a n c en e wp r o j e c t s—n e wp r o d u c t i o nl i n e s—a si no u rf a v o r e d
model interpretation. On the other hand, the empirical evidence on new ﬁrms is that they mostly borrow from banks
to cover entry costs. Cetorelli and Strahan (2006) ﬁnd that monopoly power in banking constitutes a barrier to ﬁrm
entry in the U.S. economy. Stebunovs (2007) extends the model of this paper to study the consequences of ﬁnance
as a barrier to entry.
11where rt is the consumption-based interest rate on holdings of bonds between t − 1 and t (known
with certainty as of t − 1). The household maximizes its expected intertemporal utility subject to
(2).
The Euler equations for bond and share holdings are:
(Ct)













As expected, forward iteration of the equation for share holdings and absence of speculative bubbles
yield the asset price solution in equation (1).27







Equilibrium, Aggregate Accounting, and the Labor Market
Aggregating the budget constraint (2) across households and imposing the equilibrium conditions
Bt+1 = Bt =0and xt+1 = xt =1∀t yields the aggregate accounting identity Ct + NE,tvt =
wtLt + Ntdt: Total consumption plus investment (in new ﬁrms) must be equal to total income
(labor income plus dividend income).
Diﬀerent from the benchmark, one-sector, RBC model of Campbell (1994) and many other
studies, our model economy is a two-sector economy in which one sector employs part of the labor
supply to produce consumption and the other sector employs the rest of the labor supply to produce
new ﬁrms. The economy’s GDP, Yt, is equal to total income, wtLt + Ntdt. In turn, Yt is also the
total output of the economy, given by consumption output, Ct, plus investment output, NE,tvt.
With this in mind, vt is the relative price of the investment “good” in terms of consumption.
Labor market equilibrium requires that the total amount of labor used in production and to set
up the new entrants’ plants must equal aggregate labor supply: LC
t +LE
t = Lt,w h e r eLC
t = Ntlt is
the total amount of labor used in production of consumption, and LE
t = NE,tfE,t/Zt is labor used
to build new ﬁrms.28 In the benchmark RBC model, physical capital is accumulated by using as
investment part of the output of the same good used for consumption. In other words, all labor is
27We omit the transversality conditions for bonds and shares that must be satisﬁed to ensure optimality. Note
that the interest rate is determined residually in our economy (it appears only in the Euler equation for bonds and
is fully determined once consumption is determined). This is due to the absence of physical capital. Indeed, what is
crucial in our economy for the allocation of intertemporal consumption is the return on shares.
28We used the equilibrium condition yt = Ztlt = ct =( ρt)
−θ Ct in the expression for L
C
t .
12allocated to the only productive sector of the economy. When labor supply is ﬁxed, there are no
labor market dynamics in the model, other than the determination of the equilibrium wage along a
vertical supply curve. In our model, even when labor supply is ﬁxed (the case ϕ =0 ), labor market
dynamics arise in the allocation of labor between production of consumption and creation of new
plants. The allocation is determined jointly by the entry decision of prospective entrants and the
portfolio decision of households who ﬁnance that entry. The value of ﬁrms, or the relative price of
investment in terms of consumption vt, plays a crucial role in determining this allocation, and is at
the center of our model’s propagation mechanism. Based on this price, the household decides how
much to invest in the ﬁnancing of entry, and prospective entrants decide whether to enter or not.
In turn, entry determines the amount of labor that is allocated to setting up new production lines
(rather than producing consumption goods).29 Moreover, entry at time t aﬀects labor demand at
t +1because it increases the number of producing ﬁrms at t +1 .30
Model Summary
Table 2 summarizes the main equilibrium conditions of the model.31 The equations in the table
constitute a system of ten equations in ten endogenous variables: ρt,μ t,d t,w t,L t,N E,t,N t,r t,v t,
Ct. Of these endogenous variables, two are predetermined as of time t: the total number of ﬁrms,
Nt, and the risk-free interest rate, rt. Additionally, the model features two exogenous variables:
aggregate productivity, Zt,a n dt h es u n ke n t r yc o s t ,fE,t. The latter may be interpreted in at least
two ways. Part of the sunk entry cost fE,t originates in the economy’s technology for creation of
new plants, which is exogenous and outside the control of policymakers. But another part of the
entry cost is motivated by regulation and entry barriers induced by policy. Holding the technology
component of fE,t given, we interpret changes in fE,t below as changes in market regulation facing
ﬁrms.32
29With elastic labor supply, labor market dynamics operate along two margins as the interaction of household and
entry decisions determines jointly the total amount of labor and its allocation to the two sectors of the economy.
30This is akin to the benchmark RBC model, where investment at t aﬀects labor demand at t+1by increasing the
capital stock used in production at t+1. Capital accumulation in the RBC model can be viewed as an extreme case
in which all observed investment goes toward the production of existing goods. Our baseline framework studies the
other possible extreme, in which all investment is accounted for by the creation of new products. We study a setup
in which investment is split endogenously between the creation of new products and augmenting the physical capital
stock below.
31The labor market equilibrium condition is redundant once the variety eﬀect equation is included.
32Results on the consequences of government spending shocks in our model are available on request.
13Table 2. Benchmark Model, Summary
Pricing ρt = μt
wt
Zt
Markup μt = μ(Nt)








Free entry vt = wt
fE,t
Zt





Euler equation (bonds) (Ct)












Aggregate accounting Ct + NE,tvt = wtLt + Ntdt
3 Benchmark Model Properties and Solution
Steady State
We assume that exogenous variables are constant in steady state and denote steady-state levels
of variables by dropping the time subscript: Zt = Z,a n dfE,t = fE. We conjecture that all
endogenous variables are constant in steady state and show that this is indeed the case.33 The
steady-state interest rate is pinned down as usual by the rate of time preference, 1+r = β−1;
the gross return on shares is 1+d/v =( 1+r)/(1 − δ), which captures a premium for expected
ﬁrm destruction. The number of new entrants makes up for the exogenous destruction of existing
ﬁrms: NE = δN/(1 − δ). We follow Campbell (1994) below and exploit 1+r = β−1 to treat r as
a parameter in the solution.
Calculating the shares of proﬁt income and investment in consumption output and GDP allows
us to draw another transparent comparison between our model and the standard RBC setup. The
steady-state proﬁt equation gives the share of proﬁt income in consumption output: dN/C =
(μ − 1)/μ. Using this result in conjunction with tho s eo b t a i n e da b o v e ,w eh a v et h es h a r eo f
investment in consumption output, denoted by γ: vNE/C = γ ≡ (μ − 1)δ/[μ(r + δ)].T h i s
33Our model would exhibit endogenous growth if the cost of entry were a decreasing function of the number
of producers, fE,t/Nt, as in Grossman and Helpman (1991). We abstract from by now well understood growth
considerations in order to focus on the business cycle implications of entry.
14expression is similar to its RBC counterpart. There, the share of investment in output is given by
sKδ/(r + δ), where δ is the depreciation rate of capital and sK is the share of capital income in
total income. In our framework, (μ − 1)/μ can be regarded as governing the share of “capital” since
it dictates the degree of monopoly power and hence the share of proﬁts that ﬁrms generate from
producing consumption output (dN/C). Noting that Y = C+ vNE, the shares of investment and
proﬁti n c o m ei nG D Pa r evNE/Y = γ/(1 + γ) and dN/Y =[ ( r + δ)γ]/[δ (1 + γ)], respectively. It
follows that the share of consumption in GDP is C/Y =1 /(1 + γ). The share of labor income in
total income is wL/Y =1− [(r + δ)γ]/[δ (1 + γ)].34 Importantly, all these ratios are constant. If
we allowed for long-run growth (either via an exogenous trend in Zt, or endogenously by assuming
entry cost fE,t/Nt), these long-run ratios would still be constant with C.E.S. preferences, consistent
with the Kaldorian growth facts. In fact, regardless of preference speciﬁcation within the homothetic
class, our model’s long-run properties with growth are consistent with two stylized facts originally
found by Kaldor (1957): a constant share of proﬁts in total capital, dN/vN =( r + d)/(1 − d),
and, relatedly, a high correlation between the proﬁt share in GDP and the investment share in
GDP.35 These facts are absent from both the standard RBC model and the frictionless entry
models reviewed in the Introduction.
To obtain a closed-form solution for the steady state, we distinguish according to the two
functional forms for preferences (and therefore the markup and variety functions) considered above.
In the C.E.S. case, the markup is always equal to a constant: μ(N)=θ/(θ − 1), and the variety
eﬀect is governed by ρ(N)=N
1


















Intuitively, an increase in long-run productivity results in a larger number of ﬁrms (and hence
higher ﬁrm value, v =[ ( θ − 1)/θ]fE
¡
NCES¢ 1
θ−1, and consumption). Deregulation (a lower sunk
entry cost) also generates an increase in the long-run number of ﬁrms and consumption, and it
increases ﬁrm value as a proportion of the sunk cost itself (v/fE).36 The eﬀect of deregulation on
34Note that all these ratios are identical if we compute them in terms of empirically relevant variables deﬂated by
the average price p (see the discussion below).
35Note also that balanced growth would be restored under translog preferenced by assuming that the parameter σ
decreases at the same rate as Nt increases in the long run.
36See Alesina, Ardagna, Nicoletti, and Schiantarelli (2005) for empirical evidence supporting the view that dereg-
ulation generates entry and therefore stimulates investment.
15vCES depends on whether θ is larger or smaller than two. Empirically plausible values of θ,w h i c h
satisfy θ>2, imply that deregulation has a negative eﬀect on ﬁrm value. Importantly, CCES and
NCES tend to zero if θ tends to inﬁnite. For ﬁrms to ﬁnd it proﬁtable to enter, the expected present
discounted value of the future proﬁts t r e a mm u s tb ep o s i t i v e ,s oa st oo ﬀset the sunk entry cost.
But proﬁts tend to zero in all periods if ﬁrms have no monopoly power. This implies that no ﬁrm
will enter the economy, driving NCES and CCES to zero.























Both higher productivity and deregulation result in a higher wage, as a larger number of ﬁrms
puts pressure on labor demand. Most importantly, deregulation and higher productivity cause
steady-state marginal cost w/Z to increase (the long-run elasticity being 1/(θ − 1)). This is in
sharp contrast to models with a constant number of ﬁrms, where marginal cost would be constant
relative to long-run changes in productivity. (To see this, set N =1for convenience and note that
w/Z =( θ − 1)/θ in this case.) Changes in productivity would be reﬂected in equal percentage
changes in the real wage, so that marginal cost remains constant.37 In a model with endogenous
number of ﬁrms, higher productivity results in a more attractive business environment, which leads
to more entry and a larger number of ﬁrms. This puts pressure on labor demand that causes w to
increase by more than Z, so that the new long-run marginal cost is higher than the original one.38
Given solutions for v, C, N,a n dw/Z, it is easy to recover solutions for all other variables in Table
2, which we omit. To complete the information on the steady-state properties of the model with
C.E.S. preferences, Table 3 reports the long-run elasticities of endogenous variables to permanent
changes in Z and fE.
37In fact, marginal cost (wt/Zt = ρt/μt) would be constant in all periods, in and out of the steady state, if the
number of ﬁrms were constant — and Nt =1would imply ρt =1and μt = μ, as in standard models without entry.
(To see this in the translog case in Table 2, set Nt = ˜ N =1 .) In our model, even the data-consistent measure of
marginal cost wR,t/Zt =( wt/Zt)/ρt =1 /μt is not constant (except for C.E.S. preferences): Indeed, it is procyclical
whenever markups are countercyclical.
38This mechanism is central for Ghironi and Melitz’s (2005) result that a permanent increase in productivity
results in higher average prices and an appreciated real exchange rate in the country that experiences such higher
productivity relative to its trading partners.
16Table 3. Benchmark Model, C.E.S., Long-Run Elasticities
Elasticity of ⇓ w.r.t. ⇒ Zf E











As argued in Ghironi and Melitz (2005), when discussing model properties in relation to em-
pirical evidence, it is important to recognize that empirically relevant variables — as opposed to
welfare-consistent concepts — net out the eﬀect of changes in the range of available varieties. The
reason is that construction of CPI data by statistical agencies does not adjust for availability of
new varieties as in the welfare-consistent price index.39 CPI data are closer to pt than Pt.F o rt h i s
reason, when investigating the properties of the model in relation to the data (for instance, when
computing second moments below), one should focus on real variables deﬂated by a data-consistent
price index. For any variable Xt in units of the consumption basket, such data-consistent counter-
part is obtained as XR,t ≡ PtXt/pt = Xt/ρt = Xt/ρ(Nt). In the C.E.S. case, ρt =( Nt)
1
θ−1.T h i s
implies that the long-run elasticities of data-consistent prices and quantities to productivity and
regulation changes are obtained by subtracting 1/(θ − 1) from the elasticities in Table 3.40
In the translog case, the steady-state markup function is μ(N)=1+1 /(σN).T h en u m b e ro f









¸ϕ [N (1 + σN)]
−ϕ
δ + σN (r + δ)
≡ H (N), (6)
39Furthermore, adjustment for variety, when it happens, certainly does not happen at the frequency represented
by periods in our model.
40The deﬁnition of empirically relevant variables has implications for the interpretation of Nt as an endogenous
productivity shifter in Chatterjee and Cooper (1993) and Devereux, Head, and Lapham (1996a,b). Similarly to
those papers, we can write aggregate production of consumption as Ct = Ztρ(Nt)(Lt − fE,tNE,t/Zt) and GDP as
Yt = Ztρ(Nt){Lt − [μ(Nt) − 1]fE,tNE,t/[μ(Nt)Zt]}. An increase in the number of entrants NE,t absorbs productive
resources in the form of eﬀective labor and acts like an overhead cost. This cost is accounted for diﬀerently in GDP,
since this recognizes that ﬁrm entry is productive. These expressions induce Devereux, Head, and Lapham (1996a,b)
to interpret Nt as an endogenous aggregate productivity shifter. Since ρ
0 (Nt) > 0, an increase in the number of active
ﬁrms Nt h a sas i m i l a re ﬀect to that of an endogenous increase in productivity on welfare-consistent consumption and
GDP. However, data-consistent measures, CR,t and YR,t, remove the role of variety as an endogenous productivity
shifter. This is a reason to prefer interpreting Nt as the economy’s capital stock during period t,t r e a t i n gZt as the
(exogenous) measure of aggregate productivity in production of consumption and new varieties. This interpretation
does not hinge on the properties of homothetic preferences to endogenize productivity and is consistent with Melitz
(2003) in the absence of ﬁrm heterogeneity and endogenous exit.
17which shows that NTrans is a ﬁxed point of the function H (N). Since H (N) is continuous and
limN→0 H (N)=∞ and limN→∞ H (N)=0 ,H(N) has a unique ﬁx e dp o i n ti fa n do n l yi fH0 (N) ≤
0. Straightforward diﬀerentiation of H (N) shows that this is indeed the case, and hence there exists
a unique NTrans that solves the nonlinear equation (6). In the special case of inelastic labor (ϕ =0 ),





δ2 +4 σ Z
fE (r + δ)(1− δ)
2σ(r + δ)
. (7)
An intuitive explanation of the eﬀects of long-run increases in technology and deregulation is
possible. Suppose that Z = fE =1 .A ni n c r e a s ei nZ, or a decrease in fE, from the initial value
of 1 shifts the H (N) schedule upward, and hence leads to an increase in NTrans. This increase is
larger the larger the elasticity of labor supply. Since ρ0 (N) > 0 and μ0 (N) < 0, the increase in
technology also translates into a permanent increase in consumption, the value of the ﬁrm, wage
and marginal cost (recall that for fE =1 ,v= w/Z = ρ(N)/μ(N)).
I nt h eq u a n t i t a t i v ee x e r c i s e sb e l o w ,w eu s eas p e c i ﬁc calibration scheme, which ensures that
steady-state number of ﬁrms and markup under translog preferences are the same as under C.E.S.
(We make this assumption since we only observe one set of data, and hence only one value for N
and μ.) We can achieve this for translog preferences by an appropriate choice of the parameter σ
(denoted with σ∗ below), which we describe in detail in the appendix.












Note that hours are indeed constant relative to variation in long-run productivity and regulation.
Dynamics
W es o l v ef o rt h ed y n a m i c si nr e s p o n s et oe x o g e n o us shocks by log-linearizing the model around
the steady state obtained above. However, the model summary in Table 2 already allows us to
draw some conclusions on the properties of shock responses for some key endogenous variables. It
is immediate to verify that ﬁrm value is such that vt = wtfE,t/Zt = fE,tρ(Nt)/μ(Nt).S i n c et h e
number of producing ﬁrms is predetermined and does not react to exogenous shocks on impact, ﬁrm
value is predetermined with respect to productivity shocks, while the real wage is predetermined
18with respect to changes in the sunk entry cost fE,t. A fall in the latter encourages entry and
decreases ﬁrm value on impact since more ﬁrms start producing at t+1, which implies an expected
decrease in demand for each individual ﬁrm. An increase in productivity results in a proportional
increase in the real wage on impact through its eﬀect on labor demand. Since the entry cost is
paid in eﬀective labor units, this does not aﬀect ﬁrm value. An implication of the wage schedule
wt = Ztρ(Nt)/μ(Nt) is also that marginal cost, wt/Zt, is predetermined with respect to both
shocks.
We can reduce the system in Table 2 to a system of two equations in two variables, Nt and
Ct (see the appendix). Using sans-serif fonts to denote percent deviations from steady-state levels,























































where η ≡ μ0 (N)N/μ(N) ≤ 0 is the elasticity of the markup function with respect to N,which
takes the value of 0 under C.E.S and −(1 + σN)
−1 under translog preferences. Equation (9) states
that the number of ﬁrms producing at t+1increases if consumption at time t is lower (households
save more in the form of new ﬁrms), if the sunk entry cost is below the initial level, or if productivity
is higher. Equation (10) states that consumption at time t is higher the higher expected future
consumption and the larger the number of ﬁrms producing at time t. Current deregulation lowers
current consumption, because households save more to ﬁnance faster ﬁrm entry. However, expected
future deregulation boosts current consumption as households anticipate the availability of more
varieties in the future. The eﬀect of Nt+1 depends on parameter values. For realistic parameter
values, we have   − η>(r + δ)/(1 − δ):A ni n c r e a s ei nt h en u m b e ro fﬁrms producing at t +1
is associated with lower consumption at t. (Higher productivity at time t lowers contemporaneous
consumption through this channel, as households save to ﬁnance faster entry in a more attractive
19economy. However, we shall see below that the general equilibrium eﬀect of higher productivity
will be that consumption rises.)
In the appendix, we show that the system (9)-(10) has a unique, non-explosive solution for any
possible parametrization. To solve the system, we assume Zt = φZZt−1+εZ,t,w h e r eεZ,t is an i.i.d.,
Normal innovation with zero mean and variance σ2
εZ.D i ﬀerently from productivity, we do not treat
fE,t as a stochastic process subject to random innovations at business cycle frequency. We assume
that market regulation is controlled by a policymaker, who can change it in more or less persistent
fashion, so that fE,t = φfEfE,t−1 in all periods after an initial change.
4 Business Cycles: Propagation and Second Moments
In this section we explore the properties of our benchmark model by means of a numerical example.
We compute impulse responses to productivity and deregulation shocks. The responses substantiate
the results and intuitions in the previous section. Then, we compute second moments of our artiﬁcial
economy and compare them to second moments in the data and those produced by a standard RBC
model.41
Calibration
In our baseline calibration, we interpret periods as quarters and set β = .99 to match a 4 percent
annualized average interest rate. We set the size of the exogenous ﬁrm exit shock δ = .025 to
match the U.S. empirical level of 10 percent job destruction per year.42 Under C.E.S. preferences,
we use the value of θ from Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and Kortum (2003) and set θ =3 .8,w h i c hw a s
calibrated to ﬁt U.S. plant and macro trade data.43 In our model, this choice implies a share of
investment in GDP (vNE/Y) around 16 percent. We set initial productivity to Z =1 . The initial
41Numerical results are obtained using the Matlab Toolkit described in Uhlig (1999).
42Empirically, job destruction is induced by both ﬁrm exit and contraction. In our model, the “death” shock δ
takes place at the product level. In a multi-product ﬁrm, the disappearance of a product generates job destruction
without ﬁrm exit. Since we abstract from the explicit modeling of multi-product ﬁrms, we include this portion of job
destruction in δ.A sah i g h e rδ implies less persistent dynamics, our choice of δ is also consistent with not overstating
the ability of the model to generate persistence.
43It may be argued that the value of θ results in a steady-state markup that is too high relative to the evidence.
However, it is important to observe that, in models without any ﬁxed cost, θ/(θ − 1) is a measure of both markup
over marginal cost and average cost. In our model with entry costs, free entry ensures that ﬁr m se a r nz e r op r o ﬁts
net of the entry cost. This means that ﬁrms price at average cost (inclusive of the entry cost). Thus, although
θ =3 .8 implies a fairly high markup over marginal cost, our parametrization delivers reasonable results with respect
to pricing and average costs. The main qualitative features of the impulse responses below are not aﬀected if we set
θ =6 ,r e s u l t i n gi na20 percent markup of price over marginal cost as in Rotemberg and Woodford (1992) and several
other studies.
20steady-state entry cost fE does not aﬀect any impulse response under C.E.S. preferences and under
translog for the σ∗ calibration; we therefore set fE =1without loss of generality.44 The value of σ
that ensures equality of steady-state markup and number of ﬁr m sa c r o s sp r e f e r e n c es p e c i ﬁcations
for the baseline parameterization is σ∗ = .35323.W ec o n s i d e rd i ﬀerent values for the elasticity of
labor supply, ϕ, and we set the weight of the disutility of labor in the period utility function, χ,s o
that the steady-state level of labor eﬀort in (8) is 1 — and steady-state levels of all variables are the
same — regardless of ϕ.45
Impulse responses
Productivity
Figure 3 shows the responses (percent deviations from steady state) to a permanent 1 percent
increase in productivity for the inelastic labor case, comparing the two alternative preference struc-
tures, C.E.S. and translog. Periods are interpreted as quarters, and the number of years after the
shock is on the horizontal axis. Consider ﬁrst the long-run eﬀects in the new steady state for C.E.S.
preferences (round markers). As was previously described, the business environment becomes more
attractive, drawing a permanently higher number of entrants (NE), which translates into a perma-
nently higher number of producers (N). This induces marginal cost (w/Z)a n dt h er e l a t i v ep r i c e
of each product (ρ)t ob eh i g h e r .G D P( Y ) and consumption (C)a l s or i s ep e r m a n e n t l y ,a n dt h e y
do so by more than the increase in productivity due to the expansion in the range of available
varieties. Individual ﬁrm output (y)i sn o ta ﬀected as the increase in the relative price oﬀsets the
larger demand resulting from higher consumption. Proﬁts per ﬁrm (d)a n dﬁrm value (v)a r ea l s o
permanently higher.46
The long-run eﬀects in the case of translog preferences (cross markers) are clearly diﬀerent from
the C.E.S. ones, despite the initial steady state being the same by construction. The main diﬀerence
comes from the dampening eﬀect of the increase in the number of producers on the markup (μ),
due to the demand-side pricing complementarities generated by these preferences. The increased
proﬁtability drawing new producers into the market and the beneﬁt of additional variety are lower
44The total number of ﬁrms in steady state is inversely proportional to fE —a n dt h es i z ea n dv a l u eo fa l lﬁrms are
similarly proportional to fE. Basically, changing fE amounts to changing the unit of measure for output and number
of ﬁrms. As in the C.E.S. case, the ‘long-run scale’ of the economy Z/fE does not matter for dynamics with translog
preferences under the σ
∗ calibration.
45This requires χ = .924271.
46Permanently higher ﬁrm value and number of entrants result in permanently higher investment (in units of
consumption), I
E ≡ vNE.
21than under C.E.S. preferences precisely because of this negative eﬀect on the markup. Hence,
the new steady-state number of producers is lower, and ﬁrm value, relative price, real wage, and
marginal cost are all lower than under C.E.S. Since less resources are used for the creation of new
ﬁrms, relatively more resources are used for producing existing goods. Thus, individual ﬁrm output
is permanently above its initial steady state — in contrast to the C.E.S. case, and consistent with
the evidence in Bernard, Redding, and Schott (2006) that adjustments along both the intensive
and extensive margins coexist in the medium to long run.
Transition dynamics highlight the role of the number of ﬁrms as the key endogenous state
variable, and of ﬁrm value vt as the key price for household ﬁnance and ﬁrm entry decisions in
our model. Absent sunk entry costs, and the associated time-to-build lag before production starts,
the number of producing ﬁrms Nt would immediately adjust to its new steady-state level. Sunk
costs and time-to-build imply that Nt is a state variable that behaves very much like the capital
stock in the standard RBC model: The number of entrants (new production lines) NE,t represents
the consumers’ investment, which translates into increases in the stock of production lines Nt over
time. The number of entrants NE,t overshoots on impact because the price of shares vt (which
agents forecast in a rational expectations equilibrium) is expected to increase permanently in the
future, making it proﬁtable to over-invest today relative to the new long-run level of ﬁrm creation.
Marginal cost and the relative price ρt react to the shock with a lag and start increasing only in
the period after the shock as a larger number of producing ﬁrms puts pressure on labor demand.
The responses of ﬁrm-level output and GDP highlight the diﬀerent roles of intensive and ex-
tensive margins during economic expansions in response to permanent productivity improvements.
In both cases, ﬁrm-level output booms on impact in response to larger consumption. In the C.E.S.
case, the increase in ρt pushes ﬁrm-level output back to the initial steady state. Over time, the
expansion along the intensive margin is reabsorbed as the increase in the number of ﬁrms puts
pressure on labor costs. Since output per ﬁrm returns to the initial steady state in the long run,
the increase in productivity is oﬀset by a matching decrease in ﬁrm-level employment as the cost
of labor increases during the transition. Eventually, the expansion operates only through the ex-
tensive margin. Thus, our model predicts that the expansionary eﬀect of higher productivity is
initially transmitted through the intensive margin as output per ﬁrm rises, but it is the extensive
margin that delivers GDP expansion in the long run with C.E.S. preferences. In the translog case,
the intensive margin does not fade out in the long run, since the increase in the number of ﬁrms
is not enough to prevent output per ﬁrm from increasing; therefore, while it is still true that the
22intensive margin accounts for all of the initial GDP expansion, the intensive and extensive margins
coexist in the long run.47
Importantly, during the transition in both cases, there is a reallocation of the ﬁxed labor supply
from production of consumption to production of new ﬁrms, as implied by the increase in LE
t and
the decrease in LC
t . As the increase in productivity boosts entry, labor shifts to the construction of
new production lines. Over time, the rising cost of eﬀective labor — and thus the rising burden of
the entry cost — redistributes this labor back to production of consumption. The gradual increase
i nt h ec o s to fe ﬀective labor is the labor market counterpart to the dynamics of ﬁrm value in
explaining why the number of new entrants overshoots its new long-run equilibrium in the short
run: The steady increase in the relative price of the investment good makes it optimal to reallocate
resources (in this case, labor) from this good to producing consumption. This eﬀect is weaker with
translog preferences because of the negative eﬀect on proﬁt opportunities of an increased number
of producers.
An important implication of our model is that, in the translog case, it generates a countercyclical
markup without necessarily implying countercyclical proﬁts. Both ﬁrm-level and aggregate proﬁts
(Dt ≡ Ntdt) increase in response to the shock. Generating this result is a notorious diﬃculty of
other models of countercyclical markups with a constant number of producers (for instance, based
on sticky prices). These models imply that proﬁts become countercyclical, in stark contrast with
the data (see Rotemberg and Woodford, 1999). We return to this issue when computing the second
moments of our artiﬁcial economy.
The responses of several key macroeconomic variables deﬂated by average prices rather than
with the consumption based price index are qualitatively similar to those in Figure 3.48 Two key
results are worth mentioning: Aggregate real proﬁts (DR,t ≡ Ntdt/ρt) still increase in procyclical
fashion under both preference speciﬁcations, consistent with the evidence in Figure 1. The data-
consistent ﬁrm value vR,t = fE,t/μ(Nt) is not aﬀected at all by the shock in the C.E.S. case (because
the markup is constant and the real wage wR,t increases exactly as much as the shock); but, in the
translog case, it increases in response to technology since the markup is countercyclical.
To further illustrate the properties of our model, Figure 4 shows the responses to a transitory
47A muted increase in the number of ﬁrms with translog preferences is consistent with the fact that the beneﬁto f
variety is now smaller than the markup, reducing the household’s incentive to invest in new ﬁrms.
48For instance, this is the case for CR,t and YR,t for C.E.S. preferences, even if the increase after the initial impact
is muted and removal of the variety eﬀect implies that these empirically-consistent variables do not increase by more
than the size of the shock in the new steady state. For translog preferences, however, CR,t and YR,t still increase
by more than the size of the shock. This is a consequence of markups being countercyclical, best illustrated by the
dynamics of the data-consistent ﬁrm value vR,t mentioned below.
23but persistent 1 percent productivity shock (with persistence .9). The direction of movement of
endogenous variables on impact is the same as in Figure 3, though all variables return to the steady
state in the long run. Interestingly, for C.E.S. preferences, ﬁrm-level output is below the steady
state during most of the transition, except for a short-lived initial expansion. Diﬀerent from the
permanent shock case, the eﬀect of a higher relative price prevails on the expansion in consumption
demand to push individual ﬁrm output below the steady state for most of the transition. For
translog preferences, however, the initial expansion is more persistent for reasons described above
(it is relatively more proﬁtable to keep producing old goods since investing in new ones would
erode proﬁt margins). As in the permanent-shock case, despite markups being countercyclical,
total proﬁts are still procyclical. Notably, the dynamics of ﬁrm entry result in responses that
persist beyond the duration of the exogenous shock in both cases (but relatively more so in the
C.E.S. case), and, for some key variables, display a hump-shaped pattern.
The responses of most variables with elastic labor are qualitatively similar to the inelastic-labor
case.49 However, elastic labor implies that the household has an additional margin of adjustment
in the face of shocks. This enhances the model’s propagation mechanism and ampliﬁes the impact
responses of most endogenous variables. (The long-run responses are identical — independent of
labor supply elasticity — as explained in Section 2.) Consider the case of a transitory shock with
persistence .9 and C.E.S. preferences. Faced with an increase in the real wage, the household
optimally decides to work more hours in order to attain a higher consumption level, the more
so the higher ϕ. The impact responses of labor in the investment sector and investment in new
production lines are correspondingly larger as labor supply becomes more elastic. This adds to the
capital stock of the economy (the number of ﬁrms) and makes both GDP and consumption increase
by relatively more as ϕ increases. Except in the initial quarters, where the increase is ampliﬁed,
ﬁrm-level proﬁts decrease by more than in the inelastic-labor case since proﬁt margins are eroded
by the increased entry of new ﬁrms. But total proﬁts increase more than in the inelastic-labor
case, since the increase in the number of producers is more than enough to compensate for the fall
of proﬁts per ﬁrm. In the translog case with elastic labor, the markup becomes relatively more
countercyclical. This ampliﬁes the fall in ﬁrm-level proﬁts that follows the initial expansion, but
total proﬁts remain more procyclical than under inelastic labor — as in the C.E.S. scenario — because
49We computed impulse responses for the cases ϕ =2and ϕ =1 0 . Figures are available on request. The case in
which ϕ →∞corresponds to linear disutility of eﬀort and is often studied in the business cycle literature. See, for
instance, Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992). With ϕ =1 0 , disutility of labor is essentially linear in a neighborhood
of L =1(the steady-state level of eﬀort).
24of the larger increase in the number of producers.
Deregulation
Figure 5 shows the responses to a 1 percent permanent deregulation shock with inelastic labor
supply. In the C.E.S. case (round markers), deregulation attracts new entrants and ﬁrm value
decreases (the relative price of the investment good falls). Since investment is relatively more
attractive than consumption, there is intersectoral labor reallocation from the latter to the former.
Consumption falls initially as households postpone consumption to invest more in ﬁrms whose
productivity has not increased. The number of ﬁrms starts increasing, but GDP initially falls
as the decline in consumption dominates the increase in investment. All variables then move
monotonically toward their new steady-state levels.50 As for productivity shocks, the number
of producers increases by less with translog preferences (cross markers) than in the C.E.S. case
due to the demand complementarity leading to falling markups; the long-run expansion of GDP is
smaller, but output per ﬁrm falls by less, precisely because there is less entry into the market. A key
diﬀerence between C.E.S. and translog preferences in this scenario is that deregulation eventually
results in higher aggregate proﬁts with C.E.S. preferences, whereas aggregate proﬁts fall in the
translog case, because muted entry is not enough to oﬀset the eﬀect of lower markups.51
Second Moments
To further evaluate the properties of our baseline model, we compute the implied second moments of
our artiﬁcial economy for some key macroeconomic variables and compare them to those of the data
and those produced by the benchmark RBC model. In this exercise, we focus on random shocks
to Zt as the source of business cycle ﬂuctuations, assuming that sunk entry costs are constant at
fE,t =1 . To start with, we compute standard moments of GDP, consumption, investment, and
hours worked. Table 4 presents the results for our C.E.S. model with elastic labor. We use the same
productivity process as King and Rebelo (1999), with persistence .979 and a standard deviation
of innovations equal to .0072, to facilitate comparison of results with the baseline RBC setup. As
50In the C.E.S. case with ϕ =2 , consumers decide optimally to supply more labor and accommodate the extra labor
demand generated by the increasing number of ﬁrms. The initial decrease in labor used in production of consumption
goods is thus muted. The number of entrants increases relatively more, and, as for a permanent productivity shock,
the total number of ﬁrms, ﬁrm value, and the real wage all converge faster to their new steady-state levels. GDP now
increases due to a larger increase in investment and a smaller decrease in consumption. Figure available on request.
51The diﬀerences between C.E.S. and translog cases are similar with ϕ =2 .
25in King and Rebelo’s benchmark calibration, we set ϕ =2 .52 In each column of Table 4, the
ﬁrst number (bold fonts) is the empirical moment implied by the U.S. data reported in King and
Rebelo (1999), the second number (normal fonts) is the moment implied by our model, and the
third number (italics) is the moment generated by King and Rebelo’s baseline RBC model. We
compute model-implied second moments for HP-ﬁltered variables for consistency with data and
standard RBC practice, and we measure investment in our model with the real value of household
investment in new ﬁrms (vRNE).
Table 4. Moments for: Data, C.E.S. Model, and Baseline RBC
Variable X σX σX/σYR E [XtXt−1] corr(X,YR)
YR 1.81 1.34 1.39 1.00 0.84 0.70 0.72 1.00
CR 1.35 0.65 0.61 0.74 0.48 0.44 0.80 0.75 0.79 0.88 0.97 0.94
Investment, vRNE 5.30 5.23 4.09 2.93 3.90 2.95 0.87 0.69 0.71 0.80 0.99 0.99
L 1.79 0.63 0.67 0.99 0.47 0.48 0.88 0.69 0.71 0.88 0.98 0.97
Source for data and RBC moments: King and Rebelo (1999)
Remarkably, the performance of the simplest model with entry subject to sunk costs and con-
stant markups is very similar to that of the baseline RBC model in reproducing some key features
of U.S. business cycles. On the other hand, our baseline framework faces the same well-known
diﬃculties of the standard RBC model: Consumption and hours are too smooth relative to output;
there is not enough endogenous persistence (as indicated by the ﬁrst-order autocorrelations); and
all variables are too procyclical relative to the data.
Additionally however, our model can jointly reproduce important business cycle facts: procycli-
cal entry (product creation), procyclical proﬁts and, in the version with translog preferences, coun-
tercyclical markups. To substantiate this point, Figure 6 plots model-generated cross-correlations
of entry, aggregate real proﬁts, and GDP for C.E.S preferences and translog preferences. In both
cases, entry and proﬁts are strongly procyclical, and the contemporaneous correlation of proﬁts and
entry is positive, as in the data reviewed in the Introduction.53 Figure 7 shows the model-generated
52The period utility function is deﬁned over leisure (1 − Lt) in King and Rebelo (1999), where the endowment of
time in each period is normalized to 1. The elasticity of labor supply is then the risk aversion to variations in leisure
(set to 1 in their benchmark calibration) multiplied by (1 − L)/L,w h e r eL is steady-state eﬀort, calibrated to 1/3.
This yields ϕ =2in our speciﬁcation.
53Quantitative diﬀerences emerge, with procyclicality of entry and proﬁts excessively strong relative to the data.
Moreover, the model-generated correlations involving entry peak at the contemporaneous horizon rather than one
period later. However, the latter problem could be addressed by modifying the time-to-build requirement appropri-
ately.
26correlation of the markup with GDP at various lags and leads under translog preferences, com-
paring it to that documented by Rotemberg and Woodford (1999).54 Our model almost perfectly
reproduces the contemporaneous countercyclicality of the markup; furthermore, the time proﬁle of
its correlation with the business cycle is very similar to that documented by Rotemberg and Wood-
ford. There is a straightforward intuition for this result, which follows from the slow movement of
the number of ﬁrms in our model: When productivity increases, GDP increases on impact and then
declines toward the steady state, while the number of ﬁrms builds up gradually before returning
to the steady state. Since the markup is a decreasing function of the number of ﬁrms, it also falls
gradually in response to a technology shocks. As a consequence, the markup is more negatively
correlated with lags of GDP and positively correlated with its leads.
We view the performance of our benchmark model as a relative success. First, the model,
although based on a diﬀerent propagation mechanism from which traditional physical capital is
absent, has second moment properties that are virtually indistinguishable from the RBC model’s
concerning macroeconomic variables of which that model speaks. Second, our model can explain (at
least qualitatively) stylized facts about which the benchmark RBC model is silent. Third, to the best
our knowledge, our model is the ﬁrst that can account for all these additional facts simultaneously:
As reviewed in the Introduction, previous models that address entry fail to account for the cyclicality
of proﬁts (since they assume frictionless entry), and models that generate procyclical proﬁts (due
to monopolistic competition) abstract from changes in product space. Finally, we view the ability
to generate procyclical proﬁts with a countercyclical markup and to reproduce the time pattern of
the markup’s correlation with the cycle in the simplest version of our model as major improvements
relative to other (e.g., sticky-price-based) theories of cyclical markup variation.55
5 The Role of Physical Capital
To complete the exploration of our model as a description of business cycles, we extend our setup
to incorporate physical capital as usually featured in RBC models. There are two reasons for
this. First, our benchmark model studies an extreme case in which all investment goes toward
54Of the various labor share-based empirical measures of the markup considered by Rotemberg and Woodford, the
one that is most closely related to the ma r k u pi no u rm o d e li st h ev e r s i o nw i t ho v e r h e a dl a b o r ,w h o s ec y c l i c a l i t yi s
reported in column 2 of their Table 2, page 1066, and reproduced in Figure 7. That is because markups in our model
can be written as the inverse of the share of labor (in consumption) beyond the ‘overhead’ quantity used to set up
new product lines, μt = Ct/[wt (Lt − LE,t)]. There is of course an additional issue: This measure is speciﬁed as a
share of consumption, not GDP as in Rotemberg and Woodford. For issues pertaining to cyclicality, however, this
makes little diﬀerence, since the share of consumption in GDP is relatively acyclical.
55These include the sticky-price extension of our model in Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz (2007).
27the creation of new production lines and the associated new products. While this is useful to
emphasize the new transmission mechanism provided by ﬁrm entry, it is certainly unrealistic: Part
of observed investment is accounted for by the need to augment the capital stock used in production
of existing goods. Second, the introduction of physical capital may improve the model’s performance
in explaining observed macroeconomic ﬂuctuations. Since inclusion of capital in the model does
not represent a major modeling innovation, we relegate the presentation of the augmented setup
to an appendix, and limit ourselves to mentioning the main assumptions here.
We assume that households accumulate the stock of capital (Kt) ,a n dr e n ti tt oﬁrms producing
at time t in a competitive capital market. Investment in the physical capital stock (It)r e q u i r e s
the use of the same composite of all available varieties as the consumption basket. Physical capital
obeys a standard law of motion with rate of depreciation δK ∈ (0,1). In the version we present here,
physical capital is used to produce both existing goods and new product lines as follows.56 Producing
ﬁrms use capital and labor to produce goods according to the Cobb-Douglas production function
yt (ω)=Ztlt (ω)
α kt (ω)
1−α, and we assume that the same Cobb-Douglas production function holds
for new product creation, with the same labor share α as for production of goods. Thus, the







¢1−α,w h e r e
LE
t and KE
t are labor and capital used in setting up new ﬁrms, respectively. The free entry condition
requires vt = fE,tλt, where λt is marginal cost. We outline this model in an appendix.
This model poses problems for determinacy and non-explosiveness of the solution, which are
no longer guaranteed for standard parameter values (as there are now increasing returns to an
accumulated factor, physical capital). A unique, non-explosive solution is now guaranteed only
if we assume very fast physical capital depreciation — speciﬁcally, δK ≥ .32, holding the other
parameter values unchanged and setting α = .67. In fact, values of δK close to the threshold .32
result in empirically implausible (converging) oscillations in impulse responses. For these reasons,
we set δK = .5 and limit ourselves to repeating the exercise of Table 4 and studying how this
version of the model with capital aﬀects the second moment properties of the model. The results
are reported in Table 5.57 Bold fonts denote data moments, normal fonts the C.E.S. case, and
56We have also studied a setup in which the creation of new ﬁrms does not require physical capital, following
Grossman and Helpman (1991). That model’s behavior and performance in terms of second moments were almost
identical to those of the benchmark model without physical capital. Incidentally, note that Grossman and Helpman
showed that extending their variety-based endogenous growth model to incorporate physical capital in production of
goods did not alter the main conclusions of the model pertaining to growth. Our ﬁndings for business cycles echo
that ﬁnding and are available upon request.
57Investment is now measured as total investment, TI R ≡ vRNE + IR,w h e r eIR is real investment in physical
capital accumulation.
28italics now denote the translog case (as before, we set ϕ =2and use the same productivity process
as in King and Rebelo, 1999).
Table 5. Moments for: Data and Model with Physical Capital, C.E.S and Translog
Variable X σX σX/σYR E [XtXt−1] corr(X,YR)
YR 1.81 1.82 1.69 1.00 0.84 0.82 0.82 1.00
CR 1.35 0.85 0.97 0.74 0.47 0.57 0.80 0.76 0.77 0.88 0.96 0.95
Investment, TIR 5.30 3.30 2.83 2.93 1.81 1.67 0.87 0.81 0.80 0.80 0.99 0.99
L 1.79 0.85 0.68 0.99 0.47 0.40 0.88 0.69 0.59 0.88 0.93 0.89
Source for data moments: King and Rebelo (1999)
Inclusion of physical capital improves the performance of the model remarkably (subject to the
caveat of having to assume fast depreciation of capital). Most notably: (1) the volatility of GDP
essentially matches the data (the ‘Prescott ratio’ — i.e., the ratio of model-generated GDP variance
to data variance — is close to one); and (2) the autocorrelation of GDP is also very close to the
data value. In addition, this version of the model fares somewhat better (with respect to both
our benchmark setup and the RBC model) in what concerns the volatility of consumption and the
cyclicality of hours, especially for translog preferences. Excessive procyclicality of consumption and
investment remain features of our results, and so does too little volatility of consumption and labor.
Also, the issue remains open of how to introduce capital in creation of new ﬁrms while preserving
determinacy and non-explosiveness for standard values of physical capital depreciation. But the
results in Table 5 support the view that combining the traditional propagation mechanism of RBC
theory with our extensive margin mechanism is a promising avenue for further research.
6C o n c l u s i o n s
We developed a model of business cycle transmission with an endogenous number of producers
subject to sunk entry costs, a time-to-build lag, and exogenous risk of ﬁrm destruction. The
assumption of a general structure of homothetic preferences allows the model to nest the familiar
C.E.S. speciﬁcation with constant markups and a translog setup with time-varying markups as
special cases. The model shows that variation in the number of producers and products over the
horizon generally associated to the length of a business cycle can be an important propagation
mechanism for ﬂuctuations, consistent with the evidence documented by Bernard, Redding, and
Schott (2006). Our setup explains stylized facts such as the procyclical behavior of entry and
29proﬁts. Assuming translog preferences, it results in countercyclical markups with procyclical proﬁts,
resolving a puzzle for models that motivate cyclical markup variation with nominal rigidity.58
Consistent with evidence of slow adjustment in the number of producers, the model predicts that
output expansion by existing producers — i.e., expansion at the intensive margin — is the main
channel through which a GDP expansion takes place in the short run, but a large portion of the
expansion takes place at the extensive margin in the long run. Finally, when it comes to the second
moment properties of variables that are the focus of traditional RBC models, our setup does at
least as well as the latter for a benchmark productivity process. The endogenous stock-market price
of investment in new product creation is at the center of our propagation mechanism. A version of
the model that features also investment in traditional physical capital can reproduce the volatility
and persistence of output found in the data, albeit subject to caveats on parameter values required
for stability and determinacy.
There are several directions for future research. We take on the implications of a sticky-price
version of our model for business cycle dynamics and the conduct of monetary policy in Bilbiie,
Ghironi, and Melitz (2007). The analysis of optimal monetary policy in that article is limited
to a ﬁrst-best environment in which the policymaker has access to lump-sum ﬁscal instruments.
Studying optimal monetary policy in a more realistic, second-best world is an obvious subject for
future work.59 Extending the ﬂexible-price model to include ﬁscal policy shocks is also a promising
avenue for further exploration. The ability of the benchmark model without physical capital to
replicate business cycle moments improves along most dimensions if we include government spending
shocks as an additional source of ﬂuctuations. Assuming wasteful government consumption (with
the same composition as private consumption) that follows the same process as in Christiano
and Eichenbaum (1992), in addition to the King-Rebelo (1999) productivity process, results in
standard deviations and contemporaneous correlations with GDP that are much closer to the data.60
The only moment along which the performance of the model worsens is the correlation between
consumption and GDP, which becomes negative in most scenarios due to the familiar crowding-out
eﬀect of government consumption on private consumption.61 However, a measurement problem
58Wang and Wen (2007) further argue that producer entry (and a Leontief production structure) can reconcile
ﬂexible-price business cycle modeling with the evidence on the responses to technology shocks in Basu, Fernald, and
Kimball (2006) and Galí (1999).
59Bergin and Corsetti (2005) use a model with entry and sticky prices to study issues of stabilization policy. See
also Lewis (2006) for a sticky-wage version of our model and Elkhoury and Mancini Griﬀoli (2006) for a model in
which the entry cost is sticky.
60Details are available on request.
61While the empirical evidence is that positive government spending shocks cause consumption to increase (for
instance, Blanchard and Perotti, 2002), the negative wealth eﬀect of higher expected taxes causes government spending
30arises with reference to a government spending shock process: One should pay attention to the fact
that, while the spending shocks may be speciﬁed in units of the consumption basket in the model,
empirical estimation will in fact yield a process for government spending deﬂated of the variety eﬀect
for the reasons discussed above. Future work in this area should use a data-consistent government
spending process in a model in which non-Ricardian elements solve the consumption-crowding-out
problem.
Measurement raises interesting questions also with respect to productivity in models with en-
dogenous producer entry. To facilitate comparison with results from RBC models, we have used
an oﬀ-the-shelf productivity process in our second moment calculations. An empirical extension of
this study would be to estimate a model-consistent productivity process for our setup with entry
a n ds u n kc o s t s . 62 Finally, our model puts stock market dynamics at the center of its transmission
mechanism. A deeper theoretical and empirical investigation of the asset pricing implications of
the model will be useful to assess the extent to which allowing for endogenous business creation
can aid in solving existing puzzles in macro-ﬁnance.
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A Homothetic Consumption Preferences
Consider an arbitrary set of homothetic preferences over a continuum of goods Ω.L e t p(ω) and
c(ω) denote the prices and consumption level (quantity) of an individual good ω ∈ Ω.T h e s e
preferences are uniquely represented by a price index function P ≡ h(p), p ≡ [p(ω)]ω∈Ω, such that
the optimal expenditure function is given by PC,w h e r eC is the consumption index (the utility
level attained for a monotonic transformation of the utility function that is homogeneous of degree
1). Any function h(p) that is non-negative, non-decreasing, homogeneous of degree 1,a n dc o n c a v e ,
uniquely represents a set of homothetic preferences. Using the conventional notation for quantities
with a continuum of goods as ﬂow values, the derived Marshallian demand for any variety ω is then
given by: c(ω)dω = C∂P/∂p(ω).
B No Option Value of Waiting to Enter
Let the option value of waiting to enter for ﬁrm ω be Λt (ω) ≥ 0.I n a l l p e r i o d s t, Λt (ω)=
max[vt (ω) − wtfE,t/Zt,βΛt+1 (ω)],where the ﬁrst term is the payoﬀ of undertaking the investment
and the second term is the discounted payoﬀ of waiting. If ﬁrms are identical (there is no idiosyn-
cratic uncertainty) and exit is exogenous (uncertainty related to ﬁrm death is also aggregate), this
becomes: Λt =m a x[ vt − wtfE,t/Zt,βΛt+1].B e c a u s eo ff r e ee n t r y ,t h eﬁrst term is always zero, so
the option value obeys: Λt = βΛt+1. This is a contraction mapping because of discounting, and by
forward iteration, under the assumption limT→∞ βTΛt+T =0(i.e., there is a zero value of waiting
when reaching the terminal period), the only stable solution for the option value is Λt =0 .
CB e n c h m a r k M o d e l S o l u t i o n
We can reduce the system in Table 2 to a system of two equations in two variables, Nt and Ct.T o
see this, write ﬁrm value as a function of the endogenous state Nt and the exogenous state fE,t by




.( 1 1 )
The number of new entrants as a function of consumption and number of ﬁrms is NE,t =
A-1ZtLt/fE,t − Ct/(fE,tρ(Nt)). Substituting this, equations (3) and (11), and the expression for
proﬁts in the law of motion for Nt (scrolled one period forward) and the Euler equation for shares
yields:







































Equations (12)-(13) allow us to solve for the steady-state number of ﬁrms and consumption
(and therefore all other variables) by solving the equations:
















(1 − δ)(μ(N) − 1)
NfE. (15)
D Equating Steady States under C.E.S. and Translog Preferences
T h ec h o i c eo fσ that ensures equalization of steady states across C.E.S. and translog preferences
can be explained intuitively for the case ϕ =0with reference to Figure D.1. In the C.E.S. case, the




represented by the dotted horizontal line. The intersection of this with the 45 degree line determines
the number of ﬁrms in steady state. Choosing the value of σ that equates the steady-state number
of ﬁrms across C.E.S. and translog cases (denoted σ∗) amounts to choosing the H (N) function for
t h et r a n s l o gc a s ew h o s eﬁxed point is precisely the same (i.e., which crosses the 45 degree line at
the same point); this is given by the solid curve in the ﬁgure.
Algebraically, this can be achieved as follows in the general case ϕ ≥ 0. For any preference
speciﬁcation, the steady-state number of ﬁrms solves equation (14), which can be rewritten as:
N =[ χ(r + δ)]
−
ϕ














Since the terms up to Z/fE in the right-hand side of this equation are independent of N,equalization
of N for translog and C.E.S. preferences reduces to ensuring that the last fraction is invariant to the
A-2preference speciﬁcations. That is, we need to ﬁnd the value of σ that ensures that NTrans = NCES,


















where we used the expression for NCES in (4). It is easily veriﬁed that σ∗ =( θ − 1)/N CES
is a solution, and is unique (exploiting monotonicity of the markup function). Substituting the













E Local Equilibrium Determinacy and Non-Explosiveness
To analyze local determinacy and non-explosiveness of the rational expectation equilibrium, we can















1−δ − Θ r+δ
μ−1 ΘΦ − 1+r












and Φ ≡ 1 − δ + r+δ
μ−1 . Existence of a unique, non-explosive,
rational expectations equilibrium requires that one eigenvalue of M be inside and one outside the
unit circle. The characteristic polynomial of M takes the form J (λ)=λ2−(trace(M))λ+det(M),

























The condition for existence of a unique, non-explosive rational expectations equilibrium is J (−1)J (1) <
0,w h e r e




















Since η ≤ 0 and the right-hand side of the latter inequality is always positive, this condition is
always satisﬁed. Moreover, J (−1) = 4 + 2r − J (1) > 0 whenever J (1) < 0, so there exists a
unique, stable, rational expectations equilibrium for any possible parametrization. The elasticity









F T h eM o d e lw i t hP h y s i c a lC a p i t a l
On the household side, we now have the capital accumulation equation:
Kt+1 =( 1− δK)Kt + It, (16)
where It is investment and δK ∈ (0,1) is the rate of depreciation. The budget constraint becomes:
Bt+1 + vtNH,txt+1 + Ct + It + Tt =( 1+rt)Bt +( dt + vt)Ntxt + wtLt + rK
t Kt,
where rK
t is the rental rate on capital. Euler equations for bonds and share holdings, and the labor










On the ﬁrm side, the production function is now Cobb-Douglas in labor and capital: yt (ω)=
Ztlt (ω)
α kt (ω)
1−α . When α =1 , this model reduces to our previous model without physical capital.




t =( 1− α)
yt
kt




where λt is marginal cost. The proﬁt function becomes dt = ρtyt − wtlt − rK
t kt, where optimal
pricing yields ρt = μtλt.
As for entry, we now assume that the production technology is uniform across sectors, i.e., the
A-4production function for setting up new ﬁrms is Cobb-Douglas with the same parameters as the
consumption sector. Creating a new ﬁrm/product requires an aggregate of labor lE
t and capital kE
t







¢1−α. Therefore, the technology for setting up all new entrants, NE,t,







¢1−α .T h ef r e ee n t r yc o n d i t i o nr e q u i r e svt = fE,tλt.Cost minimization
in this sector implies rK
t =( 1− α)λtfE,tNE,t/KE
t and wt = αλtfE,tNE,t/LE
t . Since both capital
and labor are perfectly mobile across sectors, the relative capital/labor shares are equalized across















t+1, i.e., capital is rented both to ﬁrms that are producing at time t +1a n df o rs e t t i n gu pn e w
ﬁrms at t +1 . At the end of the period (when the capital market clears) there is a ‘reshuﬄing’ of
capital among ﬁrms such that there is no scrap value for the capital of disappearing ﬁrms. The
other equations remain unchanged.
We can write the equations as in the version without capital, using only aggregate variables (it
can be easily seen that all sector-speciﬁc factor ratios are also equal to the aggregate factor ratio
Kt/Lt). The complete model can then be summarized by adding the equations in the following
table to the equations in Table 2 that remain unchanged (markup, variety eﬀect, number of ﬁrms,
intratemporal optimality, Euler equations for bonds and shares).
A-5Table C.1. Model with Physical Capital in Production of Consumption and Firm Creation, Summary









Free entry vt = fE,tλt
Capital accumulation Kt+1 =( 1− δK)Kt + It







Aggregate accounting Y C
t + vtNE,t = wtLt + Ntdt + rK
t Kt
Total manufacturing output Y C
t = Ct + It













Capital market clearing Kt+1 = KC
t+1 + KE
t+1
Labor market clearing Lt = LC
t + LE
t






















From the aggregate accounting identity, combined with factor prices, the free entry condition, proﬁt
and pricing equations, and the steady-state number of entrants, consumption output is:63




































bined with capital market clearing.





























This equation yields N as a function of structural parameters, including preference parameters.






















Otherwise, N is a function of the parameters governing the functional forms of ρ(N) and μ(N),
and the calibration scheme σ∗NCES = θ−1 described above ensures that the steady-state markup


















The shares vNE/Y C and dN/Y C are unchanged relative to the baseline model without capital.
The shares of physical capital and labor income in consumption output Y C are now:
rKK



















Each of these shares consists of two parts: the share in Y C of the respective factor’s portion used
in the consumption and ‘new products’ sectors, respectively. The share of consumption output in
GDP is: Y C/Y =
¡
1+vNE/Y C¢−1. The share of total investment also consists of two components:
investment in new products/ﬁrms vNE (which includes the part of capital installed last period that
is used to produce these new ﬁrms, rKKE) and investment in new capital I. The latter can be

























































). But the share of total investment in total GDP can be higher since it



























A-8Figure 1. Growth Rates: GDP, Net Entry, and Profits
Sample period: 1947 - 1998
Net Entry Real GDP (right axis)
Panel 1: Real GDP and Net Entry











Real Profits Real GDP
Panel 2: Real GDP and Real Profits













Real Profits Net Entry
Panel 3: Real Profits and Net Entry





0.24Figure 2. Cross Correlations: GDP, Net Entry, and Profits
Hodrick-Prescott filtered data in logs, 95% confidence intervals, sample period: 1947 - 1998
























































































































































Figure 3. Responses to a Permanent Productivity Increase, C.E.S. vs. Translog, Inelastic Labor 












































































































Y to Z 
 
Figure 4. Responses to a Transitory Productivity Increase, Persistence .9, C.E.S. vs. Translog, Inelastic Labor 




















































































































Z to Z 
Figure 5. Responses to a Permanent Deregulation, C.E.S. vs. Translog, Inelastic Labor 




































































































































































Figure 7. The Cyclicality of the Markup* 
 








Figure D.1. The Steady-State Number of Firms, C.E.S. vs. Translog 
 
 
 
 
 